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Slotting allowances, which are lump-sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in 
return for various retail concessions, are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets. 
This article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously 
have been ignored: the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements, and the 
effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus. Slotting allowances 
motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices, and this raises farm 
surplus, increases total producer surplus, and improves consumer welfare in the food system. 
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Slotting allowances are lump-sum fees paid 
by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in 
exchange for access to the consumer market. 
Slotting allowances per se emerged in 1984 
and have since become an increasingly com­
mon practice in wholesale supermarket trans­
actions. While the term “slotting allowance” 
technically refers to a charge collected by a gro­
cery retailer in exchange for shelf space (com­
puter inventory systems divide shelf space at 
supermarkets into “slots”), the term is often 
used generically to describe various types of 
wholesale payments, such as introductory fees 
for new products, periodic stocking fees for ex­
isting products, ﬂoor charges for the manufac­
turer to make sales presentations, and display 
fees for special merchandising and promotion. 
The salient characteristic that uniﬁes this pay­
ment structure is that the slotting allowance 
is a lump-sum charge that does not vary with 
subsequent retailer sales. 
There is considerable disagreement in the 
literature on the purpose slotting allowances 
serve. At the center of the debate is the im­
portant policy question of whether slotting al-
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lowances have procompetitive or anticompet­
itive effects in the food system.1 
The procompetitive view of slotting al­
lowances is that lump-sum payments act 
as an instrument to ration new product 
introductions. Under circumstances in which 
agents have asymmetric information on the 
quality of a new product, a slotting allowance 
can enhance efﬁciency by serving as a sig­
naling or screening device (Lariviere and 
Padmanabhan, Sullivan, Richards and 
Patterson). The basic idea is that when 
manufacturers have superior information 
regarding the quality of new products, slot­
ting allowances mitigate the moral-hazard 
problem by allocating shelf space only to 
new products that exceed a threshold level 
of quality, which reduces the rate of product 
failure. This argument provides a compelling 
explanation for introductory fees; however, it 
also raises an important unanswered question. 
If slotting allowances indeed exist to align 
incentives under asymmetric information, 
then why do food manufacturers also pay 
slotting allowances on well-established prod­
ucts for which brand acceptance is reasonably 
well understood? Slotting allowances are 
also paid to retailers on a periodic basis to 
maintain shelf space on existing products. 
1 This question is also at the heart of the broader literature on 
vertical restraints. 
The simularity of the payment structure that 
supports slotting allowances for new product 
introductions and for periodic activities such 
as stocking, displaying, merchandising, and 
promotion suggests the need to develop a 
unifying theory that encompasses all forms of 
two-part tariff arrangements in the wholesale 
grocery market. 
The anticompetitive view of slotting al­
lowances is that lump-sum payments act as 
an instrument for retailers to exercise market 
power. Imperfectly competitive retailers have 
an incentive to use slotting allowances either 
as a mechanism to price discriminate among 
manufacturers (Cannon and Bloom, Desiraju) 
or as a facilitating practice to reduce down­
stream price competition in the consumer mar­
ket (Shaffer). The essence of Shaffer’s argu­
ment, which is closely related to the argument 
made here, is that a retailer can use revenue 
collected from a slotting allowance to support 
the payment of a higher wholesale grocery 
price. The payment of a higher wholesale price 
has no direct effect on the retailer’s proﬁt— 
the cost of this is exactly offset by the slotting 
allowance—but is proﬁtable nonetheless for its 
indirect effect on the behavior of rival grocery 
retailers. A high wholesale price signals rival 
retailers the intent to set a correspondingly 
high price in the retail market, and this soft­
ens downstream price competition. 
A merit of the anticompetitive view is 
that retail market power provides a unifying 
motivation to explain all forms of two-part 
tariffs in the wholesale grocery market. How­
ever, there is a sense in which the retail mar­
ket power story overﬁts the practice. If slotting 
allowances emerge as a mechanism for retail­
ers to exercise market power, then this raises 
the question of why the fees are systemati­
cally levied only in processed food categories 
of the supermarket? Slotting allowances are 
frequently exchanged in highly concentrated, 
processed product categories such as frozen 
and refrigerated foods, dry grocery, beverages, 
snacks, candy, and microwaveable shelf-stable 
foods. In the much-studied product class of 
fresh produce, by contrast, it is exclusively 
the shippers of bagged salad and other fresh-
cut, branded products—food processors, not 
commodity producers—who pay slotting al­
lowances to retailers (Calvin et al.). 
This article develops a theory of slotting 
allowances around food processor market 
power. The theory encompasses all forms 
of two-part tariff arrangements observed in 
wholesale grocery markets, yet provides some 
insight to explain why the practice has emerged 
in some product categories but not in others. 
Given the importance of the processing sec­
tor as a source of value-added in the food sys­
tem, it is somewhat surprising to note that the 
role of food processors in determining arrange­
ments for slotting allowances is a subject that 
has been entirely ignored. 
The observations developed here are based 
on a vertical market framework in which food 
production is organized between an upstream 
farm product market and a series of down­
stream markets (wholesale and retail) for dif­
ferentiated processed goods. In the upstream 
market, competitive farm producers sell a ho­
mogeneous farm product to imperfectly com­
petitive food processors. This conceptual treat­
ment of the farm product market joins an 
emerging literature in this journal on imperfect 
competition in the food system, which posits an 
oligopsonistic relationship between farm pro­
ducers and food processors (see, e.g., Sexton, 
Chen and Lent, Wann and Sexton, Hamilton 
and Sunding). This focus on food processor 
behavior provides a formal link between the 
farm product market and the wholesale gro­
cery market that allows welfare implications 
to be derived in terms of the size and distri­
bution of economic surplus at all stages of the 
food system. 
The model produces several notable welfare 
implications. Unlike the case of two-part tariffs 
that arise through retailer market power, slot­
ting allowances motivated by processor mar­
ket power raise farm surplus; increase the 
combined producer surplus of farmers, proces­
sors, and retailers; and improve consumer wel­
fare (under both consumer surplus and utility-
based measures). 
The Model 
The starting point for the analysis is a verti­
cal food system comprising a single upstream 
market and a single downstream market. In 
the upstream market, competitive ﬁrms sell a 
homogeneous farm product to an oligopsonis­
tic food processing industry, and, in the down­
stream market, the food processors sell a ﬁn­
ished processed good to grocery retailers at 
the wholesale level. Further downstream, of 
course, is the retail market between grocery re­
tailers and consumers. However, because the 
central forces of the model operate on incen­
tives that develop through the multimarket 
contact of food processors at the upstream and 
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Figure 1. The timing of the game 
wholesale levels of the food system, the retail 
market, which plays no direct role in the anal­
ysis, is initially suppressed by assuming a com­
petitive retail industry. The model is then ex­
tended to encompass consumer markets (and 
potentially noncompetitive retailers) in subse­
quent sections. 
The model considers slotting allowances 
that arise in a ﬁxed price contract form. A 
ﬁxed price contract, which speciﬁes a whole­
sale price and a lump-sum transfer, is a com­
monly employed contract form in wholesale 
grocery markets (Calvin et al.). 
Consider an upstream industry that pro­
duces a homogeneous farm product.2 The farm 
product is sold in an oligopsony market com­
prising n food processing ﬁrms. The level of 
farm product use by processor i is denoted 
xi and total farm product use in the indus­
try is X = i xi . The price in the farm prod­
uct market is given by the (inverse) farm sup­
ply function, which is denoted by p f (X), with 
f px (X) ≡ dp f (X)/d X  > 0. The farm product 
is used by processor i to produce a (differ­
entiated) ﬁnished processed good, yi , accord­
ing to the production function yi = f i (xi ), 
and this satisﬁes f i (xi ) ≡ d f i (xi )/dxi > 0 and x
f i (xi ) ≡ d2 f i (xi )/dx2 ≤ 0. In the absence of xx i 
a slotting allowance, food processor i sells her 
ﬁnished processed good to competitive retail 
buyers at a noncontracted wholesale price of 
pw i . 
Strategic interaction between food proces­
sors is modeled as a three-stage game, the tim­
ing of which is described in ﬁgure 1. In the 
ﬁrst stage, the contract stage, food processor 
i writes an observable and non-renegotiable 
contract with one or more of her downstream 
retailers. Letting a hat on a variable denote a 
term speciﬁed in a slotting contract, the con­
tract of processor i speciﬁes a wholesale price 
for the good ( pˆi ) and a lump-sum transfer 
2 When the upstream farm product market is heterogeneous, as 
would be the case when farm suppliers produce locationally differ­
entiated commodities, the qualitative predictions for the optimal 
processor contract are identical to those described here. For the 
interest of model clarity, this consideration is suppressed here. 
levels of the farm 
product (xi, i =1,2) 
(sˆi ) to be paid to the retailer. The equilibrium 
value of this lump-sum transfer is allowed to 
emerge without restriction on sign. In the sec­
ond stage, the retailer either accepts or re­
jects the processor’s contract. If the contract 
is accepted, the food processor pays a slot­
ting allowance of sˆi to the retailer in return for 
the retailer’s agreement to purchase the pro­
cessed good at a contracted wholesale price 
of pˆi . If the contract is rejected, then no slot­
ting allowance is paid and the food proces­
sor sells her good to the retailer at the non-
contracted wholesale price, pi 
w . In the third 
and ﬁnal stage, the food processors compete 
in a Cournot oligopsony to procure the farm 
product. 
Throughout, it is assumed that 
f f(1) p (X) + xi p (X) > 0, for all ix xx
which guarantees the existence and stability of 
the farm product equilibrium.3 Condition (1) 
ensures that the marginal proﬁt of each proces­
sor declines with the procurement level of the 
rival processors (i.e., that reaction functions 
slope downward). 
The model is solved using backward induc­
tion. Hence, the analysis begins with the pro­
curement stage, followed by the acceptance 
and contract stages, respectively. To make the 
analysis more transparent, attention is con­
ﬁned to the duopsony case. 
Suppose the downstream retailer has ac­
cepted the contract proposed by food proces­
sor i in the procurement stage. In this case, the 
objective function of processor i is 
(2) i (xi , X, pˆi , sˆi ) 
= pˆi f i (xi ) − p f (X)xi − sˆi i = 1, 2. 
In addition, there is also a sunk cost com­
ponent that explains the existence of imper­
fect competition in the processing sector; how­
ever, this plays no role in the analysis and is 
3 Expression (1) is sufﬁcient for the Routh-Hurwitz condition to 
hold on the Jacobian of equations (3). 
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consequently omitted. Maximizing (2) with re­
spect to xi yields the necessary condition 
i	
f(3) ≡ pˆi f i (xi ) − p f (X) − xi px (X) = 0i x
i = 1, 2. 
The level of farm product use by each ﬁrm and 
total industry use of the farm product are ob­
tained in the procurement stage by simultane­
ously solving equations (3). Denote these solu­
c ction values by the vectors x ≡ xi ( pˆ1, pˆ2), i = i 
1, 2 and Xc ≡ Xc( pˆ1, pˆ2). Throughout, the con-
cvention is to suppress the arguments of xi and 
Xc except when denoting the evaluation of 
these vectors at particular values of the con­
tract prices. 
Totally differentiating (3) yields the compar­
ative statics effects associated with the proces­
sor’s choice of pˆi . Noting that i i
i < 0, i j
i < 0, 
j jand  = i ii j j  − i ji j i  > 0 by (1), the com­
parative statics effects are 
∂xc	 − f i xc  j i x i j j(4) = > 0 
∂ pˆi  
and 
c c j∂x f i x j x i j i(5) = < 0. 
∂ pˆi  
Next deﬁne the ratio of comparative statics ef­
fects in (4) and (5) as 
∂x j ( ) c(6)	 x j , Xc ∂xi 
c∂x ∂ pˆij≡ c / ∂x ∂ ˆi pi 
f fcpx (Xc) + x j pxx (Xc) 
f fc cpˆ j fxxj x j − 2 px (Xc) − x j pxx (Xc) 
which is negative by the stability condition (1) 
and the second-order condition of processor j. 
A retailer is willing to accept the slotting 
contract proposed by a processor provided he 
receives a payment no less than his opportu­
nity costs. With a competitive retail industry, 
these opportunity costs can be normalized to 
zero without loss of generality. Accordingly, 
the retailer accepts the contract proposed by 
processor i whenever 
w(7) p − ˆ	 i= 1, 2.i pi yi + sˆi ≥ 0, 
In (7), processor i compensates the retailer 
for any departure of the contracted price from 
the noncontracted wholesale price through the 
payment of a slotting allowance. 
In the contract stage, processor i chooses the 
terms of the contract so as to maximize proﬁts 
in (2) subject to the participation constraint 
(7) and the procurement stage solutions above. 
Substituting the procurement stage solutions 
into (2) and (7), the contracting problem is 
Max i ( pˆ1, pˆ2, sˆi ) 
pˆi ,sˆi 
c c≡ pˆi f i x − p f (Xc)xi − sˆii 
cs.t. pw − ˆ f i x + sˆi ≥ 0.i pi i 
The optimal terms in the processor’s con­
tract specify that the retailer participation con­
straint be met with equality in (7), from which 
substitution results in the following uncon­
strained problem 
(8) Max i ( pˆ1, pˆ2) pˆi 
c c≡ pw f i x − p f (Xc)xi , i= 1, 2.i i 
Note in (8) that only the indirect effect of the 
contracted wholesale price remains; the direct 
effect of the contract price on the proﬁtability 
of processor i is exactly offset by the payment 
of the slotting allowance. 
Differentiation of (8) with respect to pˆi 
yields the necessary condition for a proﬁt-
maximizing contract 
∂xc c i(9) pi 
w fxi xi − p f (Xc) ∂ pˆi 
− xic pxf (Xc) ∂ X
c = 0, i = 1, 2.
∂ pˆi 
PROPOSITION 1. The noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium for food processor i, i = 
1, 2, is characterized by 
(i) a wholesale price above the noncontracted 
price; and 
(ii) a positive slotting allowance. 
∗ ∗ ∗Proof : Let x ≡ xi ( pˆ1 , pˆ2), i = 1, 2 denote i 
the solution to the Nash equilibrium described 
by (9). To determine the equilibrium choice of 
∗ pˆi , substitute the procurement stage solution 
(3) into (9), which gives 
∗ ∗ pw − pˆ f i x(10) i i x i 
f ∂x j∗ ∗ = xi px (X∗) ∂xi x j , X
∗ < 0 
where the inequality holds by expression (6). 
Hence, the optimal contract of processor i 
( ) ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) ( ) 
[( ) ( ) 
( ) ] ( ) 
speciﬁes a wholesale price above the non-
contracted wholesale price for the processed 
∗good, pˆ > pw , i = 1, 2. i i 
To compensate the retailer for the higher ex­
pense of unit wholesale transactions, the con­
tract speciﬁes a positive lump-sum payment. 
∗The optimal level of this slotting allowance, sˆi , 
is identiﬁed by (7) as 
∗ ∗ w ∗(11) sˆ = pˆ − p f i x > 0, i = 1, 2.i i i i 
An oligopsonistic processor has an incentive 
to pay a slotting allowance to a retailer. By pay­
ing a slotting allowance to the retailer, the con­
tracted processor is able to negotiate a higher 
wholesale price for the good, which, in turn, 
shifts the processor’s marginal value product 
function outward relative to the rival proces­
sor in the farm product market. This shift in­
creases the marginal proﬁtability of procuring 
the farm product for the contracted processor. 
In total, of course, the direct contribution of 
the higher wholesale price to the processor’s 
proﬁt is exactly offset by the payment of the 
slotting allowance. Nonetheless, the outward 
shift in the marginal value product function al­
ters the set of credible actions for the proces­
sor in her oligopsony rivalry for the farm prod­
uct. A higher wholesale price purchased with a 
compensatory slotting allowance changes the 
reaction function of the contracted processor, 
thereby allowing her to commit to a higher pro­
curement level that increases her oligopsony 
rent. 
The formal structure of the slotting al­
lowance as a precommitment mechanism is 
similar to the role of contracts in the verti­
cal separation literature (see, e.g., Bonanno 
and Vickers, Lin, Coughlin and Wernerfelt, 
Shaffer, and Hamilton and Stiegert). A slot­
ting allowance that supports a higher whole­
sale price is a commitment mechanism that 
creates an ex post beneﬁcial expansion in a pro­
cessor’s level of farm product procurement.4 
Through the use of this mechanism, the non­
cooperative oligopsony equilibrium is altered 
in favor of the contracted processor. 
Because the processors face similar market 
incentives, the noncooperative Nash contract 
equilibrium is characterized by the multilat­
eral use of slotting allowances. Nonetheless, 
the noncooperative Nash contract equilibrium 
4 It should be noted that if processors compete in prices instead 
of in quantities the optimal contract mechanism would involve a 
negative slotting allowance (a fee paid from the retailer to the food 
processor in exchange for a lower wholesale price). Such behav­
ior would not be consistent with observed practice in wholesale 
markets. 
is jointly suboptimal for the processors. The 
combined proﬁt level of the two processors 
would be higher if slotting allowances were 
reduced below their Nash equilibrium levels. 
However, if one processor chose not to pay a 
slotting allowance, she could not deter her ri­
val from paying a slotting allowance to secure 
a higher wholesale price. The noncontracting 
processor, in this case, would be worse off than 
if she had reciprocated with a slotting contract 
of her own. 
Producer Surplus Implications 
The noncooperative Nash contract equilib­
rium has the following implications for pro­
ducer surplus. 
PROPOSITION 2. At the noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium: 
(i) the joint proﬁtability of food processors 
would increase if slotting allowances were 
reduced; 
(ii) farm surplus would decrease if slotting 
allowances were reduced. 
Proof : For part (i), note by (7) that the equi­
librium level of the slotting allowance in­
creases monotonically with the contract price. 
Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to show that joint 
proﬁtability of food processors would rise, and 
farm surplus would fall, in response to a de­
crease in the wholesale contract prices. The 
joint processor proﬁt function is 
( pˆ1, pˆ2) = 
p1, pˆ2)1( pˆ1, pˆ2) + 2( pˆ1, pˆ2). Since ∂
i ( ˆ = 0 at  
∂ pˆi 
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium point, it 
follows that 
∗ ∗ ∂
 pˆ1 , pˆ2 
∂ pˆi 
c ∗ ∗ ( ) ( )∂x pˆ1 , pˆpw ∗ f j ∗ j 2 = − pˆ x xj j j ∂ pˆi 
c ∗ ∗ ∂x pˆ1 , pˆ∗ f i 2− x j px (X∗) i = 1, 2.∂ pˆi 
∗ ∗Substituting for (Pw − pˆ j ) fxj (x j ) from (10) j 
and gathering terms yields 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∂
 pˆ p ∂xi pˆ p1 , ˆ 2 ∗ f 1 , ˆ 2(12) = x j px (X∗)∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi 
∗ × 
∂
∂
x
xi
j 
xi , X∗ 
∂x j ∗ × 
∂xi 
x j , X∗ − 1 
i = 1, 2 
( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 
which is negative by (1), (4), and (6). Hence, 
∗a reduction in pˆi , i = 1, 2, increases the joint 
proﬁtability of food processors. 
For part (ii), farm surplus at the noncooper­
ative Nash equilibrium point is given by 
∫ X∗ 
∗ ∗G pˆ1 , pˆ = p f (X∗)X∗ − p f (z) dz.2 
0 
It follows that 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(13) ∂G pˆ1 , pˆ2 f ∂ X pˆ1 , pˆ2= px (X∗)X∗ ,∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi 
i = 1, 2 
which is positive by (1), (4), and (5). Hence, a 
∗reduction in pˆi , i = 1, 2, decreases farm surplus. 
Relative to a vertical market system without 
slotting allowances, the noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium is associated with a larger 
level of farm surplus. The higher wholesale 
price negotiated by each food processor in 
the slotting contract increases the total level 
of farm product procurement, and this cor­
respondingly increases the equilibrium farm 
price. 
The effect of slotting allowances on (to­
tal) producer surplus sums the gain in farm 
surplus and the loss in processor surplus. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of a uni­
lateral slotting contract on producer surplus. 
The ﬁgure depicts the special case of linear 
farm supply, homogeneous processed prod­
ucts, and ﬁxed proportions processing technol­
ogy given by f i (xi ) = xi , for i = 1, 2. In the ﬁg-
f,n n f,n n f,c cure, p (x1 ) = p (Xn − x2 ) and p (x1) = R R R
 f,c c
p (Xc − x2) denote the (inverse) residual R 
farm supply function facing processor 1 in 
the noncontracted and contracted case, respec­
tively. The residual supply function is obtained 
in each case by shifting the farm supply func­
n ction to the left (by either x or x2 units). The 2 
slotting contract of processor 1 decreases the 
equilibrium level of farm product procurement 
by processor 2 in (5), which is represented in 
the ﬁgure by the outward shift in residual sup­
ply in the contracted case. The marginal outlay 
schedule corresponding to each residual farm 
supply function deﬁnes processor 1’s reaction 
function in each case, and this is denoted in the 
nﬁgure by R1 
n(x2 ) in the noncontracted case and 
cby Rc(x2) in the contracted case. 1
Consider, ﬁrst, the benchmark social opti­
mum. This situation is depicted by the surplus-
maximizing market quantity, Xs , which is 
where the farm supply function, p f (X), 
equates with the noncontracted wholesale 
product price of the homogeneous processed 
good, pw. Next, consider the baseline oligop­
sony outcome in the noncontracted case. With­
out a slotting contract, the equilibrium level of 
0farm product use for processor 1, x1 , is deter­
mined by the intersection of the noncontracted 
Figure 2. Residual farm supply and the producer surplus implications of slotting allowances 
( ) ( ) 
[ ( ) 
( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) 
nmarginal outlay schedule, Rn(x2 ), with the 1 
wholesale price, pw. At this quantity, the equi­
librium farm price is identiﬁed by the residual 
f,n 0supply function as p f (X0) = p (x1 ), which R 
results in a total level of farm product procure­
ment of X0. 
Now consider the outcome under a slotting 
allowance. A slotting contract by processor 1 
results in the two effects shown in the ﬁgure: 
(a) processor 1’s contract speciﬁes a relatively 
∗higher wholesale price, pˆ1 > p
w; and (b) the 
higher wholesale price, in turn, shifts processor 
n1’s reaction function outward from R1 
n(x2 ) to  
cR1
c(x2). The equilibrium level of farm product ∗use by processor 1 in the contracted case, x1 , is  
cnow determined by the intersection of R1
c(x2) ∗with the contract price, pˆ1 , which results in an ∗equilibrium farm price of p f (X∗) = p f,c(x )R 1 
and a total level of farm product procurement 
given by X∗. Ignoring distributional consider­
ations, the total increase in producer surplus 
(farmers plus food processors) under the slot­
ting allowance is represented by the shaded 
region of the ﬁgure. 
A unilateral slotting allowance generally in­
creases producer surplus in the food system. 
Nonetheless, it is possible for a unilateral slot­
ting allowance to decrease producer surplus 
under circumstances in which the processing 
technology differs across ﬁrms. To see this, sup­
pose processor 2 is the more cost-efﬁcient food 
processor in the sense that f 2(x¯) > f 1(x¯) and x x 
f 2 (x¯) ≥ f 1 (x¯) for all x¯ . In this case, a slotting xx xx
contract by processor 1 produces two coun­
tervailing effects on producer surplus. The to­
tal procurement level of the farm product in­
creases, which increases producer surplus, but, 
at the same time, production in the process­
ing sector is redistributed from the low-cost 
processor to the relatively high-cost proces­
sor, which reduces allocative efﬁciency. In the 
case depicted in ﬁgure 2, this latter redistribu­
tive effect has no welfare consequence because 
the processors are assumed to have symmetric, 
ﬁxed proportions processing technology. If the 
food processors have asymmetric costs, then 
it is conceivable that a unilateral slotting al­
lowance by the relatively cost-inefﬁcient pro­
cessor reduces total producer surplus. 
Of course, the noncooperative Nash con­
tract equilibrium is characterized by multi­
lateral slotting allowances. Under multilateral 
slotting allowances, allocative efﬁciency in the 
processing sector is reduced by the contract 
of the relatively cost-inefﬁcient processor, but 
increased by the contract of the relatively cost-
efﬁcient processor. In equilibrium, the com­
bined effect of slotting allowances on alloca­
tive efﬁciency is of second-order signiﬁcance in 
the producer surplus calculation. To clarify the 
effect of slotting allowances on producer sur­
plus in the noncooperative Nash contract equi­
librium, it is helpful to suppress the offsetting 
effects of the slotting contracts on allocative 
efﬁciency. To do this, consider the case of sym­
metric food processors, f i (·) = f (·), i = 1, 2. 
PROPOSITION 3. At the noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium with symmetric food pro­
cessors, the combined producer surplus of 
farmers and food processors would fall if slot­
ting allowances were reduced. 
Proof : Producer surplus in the vertical sys­
tem is S( pˆ1, pˆ2) = 
( pˆ1, pˆ2) + G( pˆ1, pˆ2). At 
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium point, 
the effect of a change in the wholesale price 
of processor i on producer surplus is given by 
the sum of effects in (12) and (13). Combining 
these expressions yields 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∂S pˆ1 , pˆ ∂xi pˆ1 , pˆ2 f 2= px (X∗)∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi 
∂x j ( )∗ ∗ × x 1 + x j , X∗i ∂xi 
∂x j∗ ∗ + x j x j , X∗ ∂xi ] 
∗ × 1 + 
∂
∂
x
xi
j 
xi , X
∗
∗ ∗Next, let xi = x , i = 1, 2, denote the level of 
farm product procurement by each proces­
sor in a symmetric oligopsony conﬁguration, 
∗ ∂x j ∗and notice that ∂xi (xi , X∗) = (x j , X∗) in the ∂x j ∂xi 
symmetric case. This implies 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∂S pˆ1 , pˆ ∂xi pˆ1 , pˆ2 ∗ f 2= x px (X∗)∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi ( )2 
∂x j ∗ × 1 + 
∂xi 
x j , X∗ 
which is positive by (4). 
Slotting allowances increase producer sur­
plus in the food system. Relative to the case 
of wholesale grocery transactions that do not 
involve slotting allowances, the joint proﬁtabil­
ity of food processors is lower, but the level of 
farm surplus is higher and more than compen­
sates for the loss in processor surplus. 
( ) 
i 
The market equilibrium that supports each 
of the results above is subgame perfect. 
Nonetheless, in dynamic processor games it is 
possible that trigger strategies could be em­
ployed to support an outcome that increases 
processor proﬁts. The collusive outcome can be 
m m manalyzed as follows. Let x = xi ( pˆ1 , pˆ2 ), i = i 
1, 2, denote the joint proﬁt-maximizing pro­
curement levels of the farm product, where 
mpˆ are the joint proﬁt-maximizing wholesale 
prices. The solution to the cooperative proﬁt 
maximization problem provides the following 
result. 
PROPOSITION 4. The cooperative solution that 
maximizes joint processor proﬁt is character­
ized by negative slotting allowances. 
Proof : At the jointly optimal solution, 
m m∂
( pˆ1 , pˆ2 ) = 0, i = 1, 2, where
∂ pˆi 
∂
( pˆ1, pˆ2) ∂
1( pˆ1, pˆ2) = 
∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi 
∂2( pˆ1, pˆ2)+ . 
∂ pˆi 
Making use of (3), the joint optimum simulta­
neously solves 
[( ) ( ) ] ∂xc w f 1 c c f 1(14) p − ˆ x − x (Xc)1 p1 x 1 1 px ∂ pˆ1 [( ) ( ) ] 
w c c f+ p − pˆ2 f 2 x − x2 p (Xc)2 x 2 x 
∂xc 2× = 0
∂ pˆ1 
and 
[( ) ( ) ] ∂xc 
w c c f 1(15) p − pˆ1 f 1 x − x (Xc)1 x 1 1 px ∂ pˆ2 [( ) ( ) ] 
w c c f+ p − pˆ2 f 2 x − x2 p (Xc)2 x 2 x 
∂xc 2× = 0.
∂ pˆ2 
By inspection of (14) and (15), the unique so­
lution to this problem is 
m f x px (Xm )w m ip − pˆ = ( ) > 0i i mf i xx i 
for i = 1, 2. 
Thus, the joint proﬁt-maximizing contract 
prices are set below the noncontracted whole­
sale prices. Accordingly, the levels of the slot­
ting fees that maximize joint processor proﬁt 
follow from (7) as 
mf i x
m m f i sˆ = −x p (Xm ) ( ) < 0i i x mfxi xi 
for i = 1, 2. 
In a collusive situation, the processors maxi­
mize joint proﬁt by establishing contract terms 
with retailers that stipulate negative slotting 
allowances in exchange for lower wholesale 
prices. A wholesale price reduction shifts the 
marginal value product function downward 
for each processor in the farm product mar­
ket, which reduces procurement levels and de­
creases farm prices to the monopsony level 
that maximizes joint processor proﬁt. Con­
sistent with this outcome, it is interesting to 
note that, in some cases, large food processors 
have made public claims not to pay slotting 
allowances.5 
Extension to the Retail Market 
Thus far, the analysis has suppressed an im­
portant element of the food system: the mar­
ket contact between a grocery retailer and his 
consumers. The goal of this section is to for­
mally connect the model to the downstream 
retail market. The analysis proceeds in two 
portions. In the ﬁrst portion, a single myopic 
retailer is considered who does not antici­
pate the effect of the slotting allowance on 
retail prices. This situation produces an equiv­
alent contracting environment to that which 
obtained previously under perfect retail com­
petition. The noncooperative Nash contract 
equilibrium is extended in this framework to 
examine the effect of slotting allowances on re­
tail prices and consumer welfare. In the second 
portion, nonmyopic retailer behavior is consid­
ered and conditions are derived under which 
processor-motivated slotting allowances con­
tinue to emerge in the noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium. 
The retail sector is framed in a highly stylized 
fashion. A single grocery retailer purchases a 
set of differentiated wholesale products, pro­
vides shelf space for them, and then sells them 
rto consumers in a retail market. Let pi (Y ) de­
note the inverse demand for product i in the 
retail market, where Y is a vector of all retail 
goods, some of which may be substitutes and 
5 A notable example is Proctor & Gamble. 
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ 
)
some of which may be complements to pro­
cessed good i. A nonempty subset of Y con­
tains processed goods produced by rival food 
processors that compete to procure a farm 
product in an oligopsony market common to 
processor i. Suppose for analytic convenience 
that the retailer stocks a single product for 
each of two processors, so that the vector of 
retail goods can be written as Y = (y1, y2). All 
other arguments that inﬂuence retail prices are 
suppressed. 
It is interesting to note that the possibility 
exists for oligopsony food processors to pur­
chase a homogeneous farm product in a com­
mon upstream market, but sell complementary 
processed goods in the wholesale market (e.g., 
corn tortillas and margarine). In the analysis 
to follow, attention is centered on the more 
common case in which food processors pro­
duce and sell differentiated substitute goods.6 
The retail (inverse) demand functions for 
processed products are assumed to be differ­
entiable and satisfy 
r r∂pi (Y ) ∂pi (Y )(16) < 0, < 0, and
∂yi ∂y j 
r ∣ r ∣ ∣ ∣∂pi (Y ) ∂pi (Y )≥ .
∂yi ∂y j 
These conditions, respectively, ensure that in­
verse demand for each retail good slopes 
downward, that the products are substitutes, 
and that, on the margin, a change in a pro­
cessor’s own-quantity has a (at least weakly) 
greater effect on the price of her retail good 
than a change in the rival processor’s quantity. 
This latter condition in (16) is met with equal­
ity in the case of homogeneous retail products; 
otherwise, the inequality holds strictly. 
To establish the effect of a slotting allowance 
by food processor i on retail prices, assume the 
retailer does not hold an inventory. In this case, 
the quantity vector that clears the retail mar­
ket also clears the farm product market. Let 
c cY c = ( f i (xi ), f j (x j )) denote this retail quan­
tity vector. Accordingly, the retail price effects 
of a slotting allowance by processor i are 
r r c∂pi (Y
c) ∂pi (Y
c) ( ∂xf i i(17) = c x xic ∂ pˆi ∂y ∂ pˆii 
∂pi
r (Y c) f j ( c )∂xcj+ c x x < 0j∂y j ∂ pˆi 
6 The qualitative predictions of the model are similar for the 
case in which retailers produce complementary goods. Details are 
available from the author upon request. 
and 
r r c∂p j (Y
c) ∂p j (Y
c) ( )∂xc i(18) = c fxi xi∂ pˆi ∂y ∂ pˆii 
r c∂p j (Y
c) ( )∂xf j c j+ c x x j∂y j ∂ pˆi 
in markets i and j, respectively. Expressions 
(17) and (18) decompose the retail price ef­
fect for each good into own- and cross-effects 
on (inverse) demand weighted by the magni­
tudes of the quantity changes. In (17), the ﬁrst 
term is the direct effect of processor i’s slotting 
contract on the retail price of her own pro­
cessed good, which is negative by (4) and (16). 
The second term is the indirect effect of pro­
cessor i’s slotting contract on her retail price 
that obtains from the output reduction of ri­
val processor j. This term is positive because 
goods i and j are substitutes; however, given 
the relative magnitude of the output effects in 
(4) and (5), the indirect effect is guaranteed to 
be smaller in magnitude than the direct effect 
by (16). This implies that the sum of effects in 
(17) is negative. In (18), a slotting allowance by 
processor i has two effects on the retail price 
of rival good j: processor i’s contract increases 
the output of processor i, which has a negative 
cross-effect on the price of good j, but pro­
cessor i’s contract also reduces the output of 
processor j, which has a positive (direct) effect 
on the price of good j. The sum of these effects 
takes an ambiguous sign because the quantity 
adjustment by processor i in response to her 
slotting allowance is larger (in absolute value) 
than the quantity adjustment of processor j. 
For homogeneous processed goods, a slotting 
allowance by processor i unambiguously de­
creases the retail price. For sufﬁciently differ­
entiated processed goods, the retail price of 
good j increases in response to a slotting al­
lowance by processor i. 
The retail price effect in (17) has two im­
mediate implications that deserve further em­
phasis. First, a slotting contract by processor i 
decreases the retail margin on processed good 
i from the noncontracted level. A slotting con­
tract that increases the wholesale price of pro­
cessor i above the noncontracted level de­
creases the retail price of good i in (17), and 
this squeezes the retail margin from both sides. 
Second, the consumer surplus implication of a 
slotting allowance is immediate from (17). A 
contract that increases the wholesale price of 
processed good i lowers the retail price con­
sumers pay for good i, which unambiguously 
( ) ( ) 
[ ( ) 
( ) 
( ) ] 
increases consumer surplus in the market for 
good i. 
A unilateral slotting contract by processor 
i inﬂuences the retail price of both processed 
goods. This implies that the total effect on con­
sumer utility is determined jointly by the price 
effects in (17) and (18). To construct a utility-
based measure for these effects, suppose dif­
ferences across individual consumers are lim­
ited to those which permit equilibrium prices 
and outputs to be determined by an aggregate 
∗ ∗utility function. Let V (y ( pˆ1, pˆ2), y2 ( pˆ1, pˆ2))1 
denote the corresponding indirect utility func­
tion. Next, evaluate this function at the nonco­
operative Nash equilibrium point and perturb 
the contract price of processor i. Making use 
of the envelope theorem, this gives 
∗ ∗ ∂V pˆ1 , pˆ(19) 2 
∂ pˆi [ r ]r∂pi (Y ∗) ∂p j (Y ∗)∗ ∗= − ∗ yi + y j , ∂ pˆi ∂ pˆi 
i = 1, 2 
where ∗ > 0 is the marginal utility of income. 
Equation (19) measures the change in con­
sumer welfare in terms of the equivalent vari­
ation. If the quantity-weighted sum of price 
effects in the square brackets of (19) is posi­
tive, then a slotting contract that increases the 
wholesale price of processed good i increases 
the expenditure level necessary to procure the 
original consumption bundle. Utility decreases 
in this case by implication. 
The qualitative effect of a unilateral slot­
ting contract on consumer welfare depends on 
the degree of product differentiation in the re­
tail market. In the case of homogeneous re­
tail products, both price effects are negative 
in (19) and it follows that consumer welfare 
unambiguously increases in response to a slot­
ting allowance by processor i. In the case of 
differentiated retail products, the sum of price 
effects in (19) is ambiguous and it is conceiv­
able that a unilateral slotting contract by pro­
cessor i reduces consumer welfare. Such a per­
verse outcome for consumer welfare can only 
occur, however, when the retail products are 
sufﬁciently differentiated and when the uni­
lateral slotting contract is negotiated for the 
processed good which is relatively less desir­
able in consumption. 
Under multilateral contracts, slotting al­
lowances have clear implications for consumer 
welfare under symmetric market conditions. 
To see this, consider the case in which the food 
processors have identical production technol­
ogy and produce processed goods that are sym­
metric substitutes in the sense of Dixit and 
Stiglitz.7 
PROPOSITION 5. At a noncooperative Nash 
contract equilibrium with symmetric food pro­
cessors, consumer welfare would decrease if 
slotting allowances were reduced. 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗Proof : Let xi = x , and yi = y , i = 1, 2, de­
note the equilibrium level of farm product 
use and output by each processor in a sym­
metric market conﬁguration. Making use of 
these conditions and the symmetry of the re­
tail price effects, ∂pi
r (Y ∗)/∂yi = ∂prj (Y ∗)/∂y j 
r rand ∂pi (Y ∗)/∂y j = ∂p j (Y ∗)/∂yi , substitution 
of (17) and (18) into (19) yields 
∗ ∗ ∂V pˆ1 , pˆ(20) 2 
∂ pˆi 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
∗ f i ∗ ∂xi pˆ1 , pˆ2= −∗ y (x ) ∗ x ∂ pˆi 
r r∂pi (Y 
∗) ∂pi (Y 
∗)× + 
∂yi ∂y j 
∂x j ( )∗ × 1 + x j , X∗ > 0, ∂xi 
i = 1, 2 
where the inequality holds by (1), (4), and (6). 
Slotting allowances reduce retail prices and in­
crease consumer welfare. 
Thus far, the retailer has been assumed to 
be myopic. Under nonmyopic retailer behav­
ior, it remains to be demonstrated that a set 
of retail market conditions exist in which slot­
ting allowances emerge in the noncooperative 
Nash contract equilibrium. To assess the type 
of retail market conditions that support slot­
ting allowances as an equilibrium outcome, it 
is sufﬁcient to identify the circumstances un­
der which processor incentives exist to increase 
wholesale prices from their noncontracted lev­
els in a two-part tariff structure. 
When the retailer is not myopic, slotting al­
lowances must compensate the retailer for the 
effect of the contracted wholesale prices on 
7 Retail goods in the symmetric substitutes model are allowed 
to be highly differentiated, but are viewed to be equally desir­
able to consumers at equal retail prices. This would be the case, 
for example, when consumers are uniformly distributed in the 
characteristic-space that differentiates the two goods. 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) 
( )
( ( ) )
the equilibrium retail prices. The level of com­
pensation necessary to induce the retailer to 
accept a contract depends on various features 
that characterize the solution to the retailer’s 
problem. The nature of the problem facing a 
multi-product retailer is interesting and impor­
tant in its own right; however, to maintain the 
present focus on food processor incentives, the 
retailer’s problem is framed with a minimal 
amount of structural detail. 
Consider a retailer who faces constant 
marginal cost of $c per unit for each good that 
is stocked on his shelf. The retailer incurs posi­
tive ﬁxed costs for providing shelf space to the 
processed goods. Suppose a solution exists to 
the retailer’s problem. At an initial position 
without slotting contracts, this solution can be 
characterized by an arbitrary level of equilib­
rium retail proﬁt on each good denoted by 
0(21) M0 ≡ r yi , Y 0 , pw i i i 
pr 0= i (Y 0) − pw yi , i = 1, 2i 
where M0 is the retailer’s marketing return i 
(or quasi-rent) on processed good i and Y 0 = 
0 0(y1 , y2 ) is the vector of equilibrium retail quan­
tities that coincides with the initial noncon­
tracted wholesale prices, pˆi = pw and sˆi = 0,i 
i = 1, 2. Marginal cost, which is constant, can 
be subsumed into retail demand without loss 
of generality. 
The retail market outcome in (21) can be 
given several interpretations. For example, the 
retailer’s problem might be speciﬁed in the 
context of a Ramsey optimization problem, in 
which case the sum of marketing returns across 
products would recover supermarket ﬁxed 
costs at retail prices that minimize deadweight 
loss (see, e.g., Baumol and Bradford). Alterna­
tively, the retailer’s problem might be one of 
multi-product retail monopoly (or oligopoly), 
in which case the retail margin on each product 
would be set to equalize marginal marketing 
returns across products. 
Given the solution to the retailer’s problem 
(21), suppose the retailer is willing to accept 
a contract proposed by processor i whenever 
the slotting allowance provides a return in the 
retail market that (at least weakly) exceeds his 
existing marketing return on processed good 
i.8 That is, the retailer accepts processor i’s con­
8 This speciﬁcation of the retailer participation constraint, which 
compensates the retailer only for the effect of a slotting allowance 
on the marketing return of retail good i, and not for its indirect 
effect on the marketing return of retail good j, might be thought 
tract whenever 
r c(22) pi (Y
c) − pˆi y + sˆi ≥ Mi 0 , i = 1, 2i 
and otherwise rejects it. 
Processor i, in turn, chooses the terms of her 
slotting contract to maximize proﬁts in (2) sub­
ject to the participation constraint (22) and the 
procurement stage solutions. Speciﬁcally, the 
contracting problem facing processor i is 
c cMax pˆi f i x − p f (Xc)x − sˆii i pˆi ,sˆi 
s.t. pi
r (Y c) − pˆi f i xc + sˆii 
r 0− pi (Y 0) − pw yi ≥ 0.i 
Noting that the optimal processor contract 
meets the participation constraint with equal­
ity, this expression can be differentiated with 
respect to pˆi to obtain 
di ( pˆ1, pˆ2)(23) d pˆi 
r 
c ∂pi (Y
c)= f i xi	 ∂ pˆi 
∂xc r	 i+ p f i xc − p f (Xc)i x i ∂ pˆi 
∂ Xc c f− xi p (Xc) , i = 1, 2.x ∂ pˆi 
A contract that speciﬁes a positive slotting al­
lowance in exchange for a higher wholesale 
price increases the proﬁt of processor i when­
ever the sum of the three terms in expres­
sion (23) is positive. The retail market features 
that support slotting allowances as a processor-
motivated outcome can be summarized from 
this equation as follows. 
PROPOSITION 6. A food processor’s incentive 
to pay a slotting allowance increases with: 
(i) the elasticity of retail demand for her 
product; 
(ii) the	 size of the retail margin on her 
product; 
(iii) the degree of oligopsony power in the farm 
product market. 
of as “fend-for-yourself” marketing. In a setting of multilateral 
contracts, each processor simultaneously writes a slotting contract 
to compensate the retailer for the marketing return on her own 
product. Alternatively, one could consider a retailer that demands 
“full compensation” from processor i for the effect of her slotting 
allowance on the marketing return on both retail goods i and j. This 
view may accord well in a setting of unilateral contracts. Details in 
the “full compensation” case are available from the author upon 
request. 
( ) 
( ) 
Proof : Substituting the procurement stage so­
lutions (3) into (23) and evaluating this expres­
sion at the noncontracted wholesale price po­
0 0 0 0sition (i.e., xi = xi ,yi = yi , pˆ = pw, and sˆ = i i i 
0), processor i has an incentive to pay a positive 
slotting allowance whenever 
r∂pi (Y 
0) ( )0 r wy + pi (Y 0) − p(24) i i∂ pˆi 
c 0 0 ( )∂x pˆ1, pˆ0 i 2× fxi xi ∂ pˆi 
c 0 0∂x j pˆ1, pˆ20 f− xi p (X0) > 0.x ∂ pˆi 
The ﬁrst term in (24) is the retail price effect 
of processor i’s slotting allowance. This term is 
negative by (17). A slotting contract by proces­
sor i reduces the retail price of good i, which 
increases the level of compensation she must 
pay in the lump-sum component to meet the 
retailer participation constraint (22). The re­
tail price effect reduces the proﬁtability of the 
contract to processor i in proportion to the ini­
0tial quantity sold in the retail market, yi . In  
terms of the retail demand elasticity, the cross-
effect of a quantity change on the price of good 
i is bounded by the own-effect in (16) and it 
follows that processor i’s incentive to propose 
a slotting allowance increases with the mag­
nitude of the (direct) elasticity of demand for 
retail good i. 
The second term is the retail margin effect. 
This term is positive. A slotting contract by pro­
cessor i increases the output of good i, which 
increases the retailer’s rent in proportion to 
the size of the existing retail margin. The in­
crease in retail rent correspondingly reduces 
the compensation necessary to meet the partic­
ipation constraint in (22) and makes a slotting 
allowance more attractive for processor i. 
The ﬁnal term in (24) is the oligopsony in­
centive for a slotting allowance. A slotting al­
lowance by processor i reduces the procure­
ment level of the rival processor in the farm 
product market, which shifts oligopsony rent 
to ﬁrm i. This term is positive and has a magni­
tude that increases as the farm supply function 
becomes more inelastic. 
Discussion and Empirical Implications 
Is the observed pattern of the slotting al­
lowances in the wholesale grocery market con­
sistent with the contract design problem of 
food processing ﬁrms? This section presents 
and interprets some underlying characteristics 
and general trends in the U.S. food system un­
der the lens of the theory. 
Several trends in the U.S. food system are 
consistent with favorable changes in proces­
sor incentives at the time slotting allowances 
emerged in 1984. In the 1961–86 period, 
Sullivan ﬁnds that the gross retail margin 
across all grocery products increased in U.S. 
supermarkets. To the extent that retail mar­
gins also increased for the subset of processed 
goods, this would increase processor incentives 
for slotting allowances. It is also widely recog­
nized that the period surrounding the emer­
gence of slotting allowances was characterized 
by considerable technological change in the 
farm sector. Technological change in the farm 
sector tends to reduce variable costs and in­
crease ﬁxed costs (e.g., by replacing farm labor 
with capital equipment), so that the adoption 
of modern technology in this period may have 
made farm supply functions less elastic and in­
creased oligopsony power.9 Finally, this period 
also coincides with the trend toward highly dif­
ferentiated retail products in the food system. 
Product differentiation in the retail food mar­
ket provides consumers with a more reﬁned set 
of product choices, which is likely to increase 
the elasticity of retail demand facing individ­
ual processed goods. These trends in the food 
system are consistent with an increase in pro­
cessor incentives for slotting allowances. 
The empirical footprint of a slotting al­
lowance under food processor incentives dif­
fers in some important ways from that which 
would be left under an alternative theory. A 
unique feature of the present model is that 
it generates potentially refutable hypotheses 
regarding the subset of products for which 
processor incentives emerge for two-part tar­
iffs. Two observations follow immediately from 
this point. First, a necessary condition for a 
processor incentive to exist is a degree of multi-
market contact at the upstream and wholesale 
levels of the food system. A farmer who sells a 
farm product directly to a retailer in the whole­
sale market can have no incentive of this form. 
This observation provides a testable prediction 
to explain why slotting allowances are com­
mon in processed product categories, but not in 
other product categories such as fresh produce 
and in-store bakery products where there is no 
element of market intermediation between the 
farm product and wholesale markets. Second, 
9 This point was ﬁrst made by Just and Chern regarding the adop­
tion of the mechanized tomato harvester in California. 
All Grocery Supermarkets 
300 
280 
260 
240 
$b
ill
io
ns
 
220 
200 
180 
160 
Source: Progressive Grocer 
Figure 3. Annual grocery sales in billions of 1982–84 dollars 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
year 
given that this necessary condition is met, the 
model outlines a number of sufﬁcient condi­
tions for food processor incentives to exist. For 
example, a slotting contract is most attractive 
in vertical markets with a high degree of retail 
competition and a large degree of oligopsony 
power in the farm product market. 
Is the theory of processor-driven slotting al­
lowances consistent with observed practices 
in the supermarket? Unfortunately, negotia­
tions for slotting allowances are often made 
orally and in private; hence public data on 
individual transactions are virtually nonexis­
tent. Nonetheless, the theory developed here 
suggests an interpretation of aggregate super­
market data based on several industry trends. 
In particular, critical differences between the 
present theory and existing models of slotting 
allowances are stratiﬁed in two dimensions of 
the data: (a) through time trends in the level 
of supermarket prices, quantities and proﬁts, 
and (b) through cross-sectional comparisons 
of gross retail margins in product categories 
with and without slotting allowances. 
The retail market features that develop 
through processor incentives for slotting al­
lowances contrast sharply with the proﬁle that 
emerges when retailers employ two-part tar­
iffs to exercise market power. In Shaffer’s the­
ory of retailer-mandated fees, for instance, the 
lens on slotting allowances is reversed in the 
sense that food processors (and not retailers) 
are driven down to their reservation proﬁt 
levels by the contracts. Positive slotting al­
lowances and higher wholesale prices obtain 
identically under forces of retail market power; 
however, the implication of the fees for mar­
ket performance is exactly opposite to that 
described here.10 Under retail oligopoly, slot­
ting allowances increase retailer proﬁt only to 
the extent that higher wholesale prices support 
higher retail prices, and this implies that the 
total quantity of retail grocery sales must de­
crease. It is, therefore, possible to distinguish 
slotting allowances that emerge through food 
processor incentives from the fees driven by 
noncompetitive retailer motivations by exam­
ining the effect of slotting allowances on retail 
grocery sales, prices, and proﬁts. 
Figure 3 depicts annual U.S. grocery sales in 
the 1966–2000 period for all grocery stores and 
for supermarkets (in 1982–84 dollars adjusted 
10 It is a somewhat striking result that a retailer oligopoly model 
with strategic complements results in a qualitatively similar con­
tract outcome as a processor oligopsony model with strategic sub­
stitutes. This result obtains because the slope of the reaction func­
tions, in each case, takes the opposite sign as the slope of the func­
tion through which market power is derived (i.e., either demand 
or supply). The qualitative implications of slotting allowances for 
welfare are opposing in the two models, however; and this is be­
cause the effect of a higher wholesale price on market quantity 
is determined only by whether the equilibrium market quantity is 
bid along a supply function or a demand function. 
by the food-at-home index). The ﬁgure shows 
that annual grocery sales, both in the U.S. gro­
cery market and in U.S. supermarkets, have in­
creased in a fairly stable manner over the pe­
riod in which slotting allowances emerged.11 
This increase in sales has matched the general 
trend in U.S. resident population over the pe­
riod: grocery and supermarket sales increased 
by 32.8% and 37.2%, respectively, compared 
with a growth rate of 34.2% in the U.S. resident 
population. The stability of the trends in retail 
sales provides some indication that slotting al­
lowances have not decreased the quantity of 
retail grocery transactions. 
Table 1 compares price changes in the con­
sumer price index (CPI) to price trends for 
all food and food-at-home (FAH) consump­
tion, which excludes food sold in restaurant 
establishments. Notice that the food-at-home 
index has not increased relative to the CPI and 
overall food index in the period. Slotting al­
lowances do not appear to have increased re­
tail grocery prices. 
There is also evidence that proﬁt levels in­
creased in the food processing sector relative 
to the retail grocery sector over the period 
in which slotting allowances emerged. In the 
1961–91 period, Messinger and Narasimhan 
ﬁnd that retail proﬁts did not increase, whereas 
food manufacturer proﬁts did not decrease in 
the 1980s relative to earlier periods in their 
sample. 
Overall, the evidence does not seem to sup­
port the premise that slotting allowances de­
rive from retailer market power. The trends 
in retail prices, quantities, and proﬁts pro­
vide some indirect evidence that slotting 
allowances are not motivated by retailer 
market power. There is also some direct evi­
dence. White, Troy, and Gerlich ﬁnd slotting 
allowances to occur predominantly in product 
categories that are characterized by a large de­
gree of retail competition. A competitive retail 
market, moreover, would favor processor in­
centives for slotting allowances. 
Slotting allowances that emerge through 
forces of food processor market power 
produce retail market features that differ 
markedly from those obtained through com­
petitive market forces. This is because the slot­
ting allowance, itself, serves as a signaling or 
11 The two discontinuities in the supermarket sales data reﬂect 
upward revisions in the nominal volume that deﬁned a supermar­
ket. In 1973, the minimum sales volume required to be classiﬁed 
as a supermarket increased from $0.5 million to $1 million, and, in 
1981, it increased from $1 million to $2 million. 
Table 1. The CPI, Food, and Food-at-Home 
Indexes 
Year CPI Food FAH 
1966 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1967 103.1 100.9 99.7 
1968 107.4 104.4 103.1 
1969 113.3 109.8 108.0 
1970 119.8 116.0 113.4 
1971 125.0 119.5 116.2 
1972 129.0 124.6 121.3 
1973 137.0 142.6 141.2 
1974 152.2 163.0 162.2 
1975 166.0 176.9 175.6 
1976 175.6 182.2 179.3 
1977 187.0 193.8 189.8 
1978 201.2 213.0 209.7 
1979 224.1 236.4 232.4 
1980 254.3 256.8 251.1 
1981 280.6 276.9 269.3 
1982 297.8 288.2 278.7 
1983 307.4 294.1 281.5 
1984 320.7 305.3 292.0 
1985 332.1 312.4 296.3 
1986 338.3 322.5 304.8 
1987 350.6 335.8 317.9 
1988 365.1 349.7 331.3 
1989 383.0 370.1 352.8 
1990 403.4 391.7 375.9 
1991 420.4 403.3 385.8 
1992 433.0 408.0 388.6 
1993 446.0 416.9 398.0 
1994 457.4 426.9 409.4 
1995 470.4 439.1 422.7 
1996 484.3 453.6 438.4 
1997 495.4 465.4 449.1 
1998 503.1 475.4 457.7 
1999 514.2 485.5 466.5 
2000 531.5 496.4 477.0 
Notes: Data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www. 
bls.gov/data/sa.htm). All price indexes are for all urban consumers; the U.S. 
city average is in 1966 dollars. CPI = the consumer price index. Food = the 
food index, including food at home. FAH = the food-at-home index. 
screening device under asymmetric informa­
tion, whereas, under processor market power, 
the lump-sum payment plays only an indirect 
role in supporting a higher wholesale price. It 
follows that evidence to differentiate slotting 
allowances that emerge through processor in­
centives from the fees that arise through com­
petitive market forces can be found by examin­
ing changes in the dynamic proﬁle of wholesale 
grocery prices. A slotting contract motivated 
by processor market power must narrow the 
gross retail margin in contracted categories of 
the supermarket by (17). 
Sullivan examines a composite measure of 
the gross retail margin across all supermarket 
products and argues that the nondecreasing 
frozen vegetables 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
year 
gross retail margin identiﬁed over the 1961–86 
period supports the competitive market view. 
There are at least three reasons why this is 
not the case. First, the 1961–86 period largely 
preceded the emergence of slotting allowances 
in 1984. Indeed, an increase in the gross re­
tail margin over this period would provide 
precisely the type of change in processor in­
centives that could explain the appearance of 
slotting allowances. Second, this period is char­
acterized by a rapid increase in the number 
of grocery products stocked. For example, be­
tween 1978 and 1987, A. C. Nielsen reports a 
34.4% increase in the number of dry grocery 
items stocked in grocery stores and numer­
ous trade articles report similarly high growth 
rates in the number of frozen and refrigerated 
items stocked in supermarkets in the 1980s. 
Given the relatively capital-intensive nature of 
frozen and refrigerated products, this is likely 
to have substantially increased retailer ﬁxed 
costs. In the absence of lump-sum transfers, an 
increase in retailer ﬁxed costs would tend to in­
crease the gross retail margin across supermar­
ket products, and, for this reason, evidence in 
time series data on the (net) change in the gross 
retail margin is largely uninformative. Third, 
the gross retail margin across all supermarket 
products is a measure that aggregates over a 
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large set of product categories, only a subset 
of which employ slotting allowances. To de­
rive evidence on the linkage between slotting 
allowances and gross retail margins for this 
subset of products, cross-sectional data are 
required. 
Table 2 compares gross retail margins for 
a selection of products in which the magni­
tudes of slotting allowances are known. Notice 
that the refrigerated/frozen-foods category has 
higher slotting fees than the candy/snacks cat­
egory, but that the retail margins for the 
refrigerated/frozen-foods category are notably 
smaller. Higher, still, is the gross retail mar­
gin for the in-store bakery category, a prod­
uct category with neither slotting allowances 
nor the element of market intermediation 
necessary to support them under oligopsony 
incentives. 
A necessary condition for slotting al­
lowances to emerge through oligopsony mar­
ket power is intermediation between the farm 
product market and the wholesale grocery 
market. For this reason, it is useful to compare 
trends in gross retail margins between pro­
cessed and nonprocessed product categories of 
the supermarket in time series data. Figure 4 
compares the relative trends in the gross retail 
margins for fresh and frozen vegetables over 
Figure 4. Percent change in gross retail margins for fresh and frozen vegetables, 1978–2000 
Table 2. Sample Slotting Allowances and Gross Retail Margins, 1997 
Product Category 
Slotting 
Allowance Subcategory 
Gross Retail 
Margin (percent) 
Refrigerated and Frozen Foods $40,000 Dairy products 
Frozen foods 
29.8 
31.7 
Candy/Snacks 
In-store Bakery 
$7,000 
None 
Crackers, cookies, biscuits 
Sweet goods 
Chewing gum 
33.9 
39.2 
35.3 
56.3 
Source: Desiraju.
 
Note: Slotting allowances are reported on a per item per store basis.
 
the 1978–2000 period.12 The gross retail mar­
gin in each product category is taken to be the 
difference between the CPI and producer price 
index (PPI), where the relative difference in 
the producer and consumer price for each se­
ries is normalized to zero in 1978. Notice that 
the gross retail margin for fresh vegetables in­
creased substantially relative to that for frozen 
vegetables in the period. This is consistent with 
a central prediction of the model that slotting 
allowances motivated by oligopsony market 
power lead to a narrowing of the gross retail 
margin on processed food products relative to 
nonintermediated farm commodities. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article has demonstrated that slotting al­
lowances may be motivated, not by grocery re­
tailers who wish to receive the fees, but by food 
processors who wish to pay them. The central 
observation that supported this result is that a 
slotting allowance paid in exchange for a retail 
concession that induces an upward shift in a 
food processor’s marginal value product func­
tion enables the processor to obtain greater 
oligopsony rent in the farm product market. 
The retail concession acquired through a 
slotting allowance was formally modeled as 
a higher wholesale price. While this form of 
retailer concession corresponds with an im­
portant contract form observed in wholesale 
grocery transactions—a ﬁxed price contract— 
slotting allowances, in general, need not be 
structured in this form. A slotting allowance 
may also be paid by a food processor in ex­
change for a variety of other retail concessions, 
such as to acquire a relatively more desirable 
shelf space position in the supermarket (e.g., 
at basket level on the corner of an aisle) or to 
12 The gross retail margin for frozen vegetables is used to proxy 
that for all processed vegetables. Prior to 1997, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics does not report price data on canned vegetables 
nor on all processed vegetables. 
exclude rival processors from obtaining shelf 
space through an exclusive territory arrange­
ment. Nonetheless, to the extent that a retail 
concession of any form induces an outward 
shift in the marginal value product function of 
the contracted processor, qualitatively similar 
results to those obtained here would continue 
to arise. 
Slotting allowances that derive from oligop­
sony market power were found to have pos­
itive implications for economic surplus at all 
stages of the food system. The noncoopera­
tive Nash contract equilibrium of the model 
was shown to involve multilateral slotting al­
lowances by food processors that raise farm 
surplus, increase the combined surplus of farm­
ers, processors, and retailers, and improve con­
sumer welfare. 
The model results suggest some interesting 
possibilities for future research into the nature 
of wholesale grocery transactions. Along the­
oretical lines, considerable research is needed 
to develop a greater conceptual understand­
ing of the forces at work in the highly differ­
entiated retail grocery sector. In the case of 
slotting allowances, there is little evidence of 
the practice at volume retailers like Wal-Mart 
and Costco, which suggests a potential link 
may exist between wholesale pricing arrange­
ments and inventory management practices at 
the retail level. In general, the marketing en­
vironment of multiproduct food retailers is a 
much-understudied area, particularly in non­
competitive contexts, and adding structural 
detail to this sector in vertical models may 
provide important insights into explaining the 
multitude of market practices that continue 
to materialize in an increasingly sophisticated 
food system. 
Further empirical research is needed to de­
velop an adequate understanding of slotting 
allowances. This article has outlined several 
possibilities in this direction by identifying 
several features that distinguish slotting al­
lowances produced under processor incentives 
Hamilton, S.F., and D.L. Sunding. 
Farm Supply Shifts on Concentration and Mar­
ket Power in the Food Processing Sector.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
80(1998):830–38. 
Dixit, A., and J. Stiglitz. “Monopolistic Competi-
from those derived under alternative market 
forces. Namely, processor incentives for slot­
ting allowances require an element of inter­
mediation between the farm product market 
and the wholesale market and are promoted 
by elastic retail demand conditions, inelastic 
farm supply conditions, and large retail mar­
gins. Ex post, the effect of slotting allowances 
was shown to narrow retail margins, and evi­
dence was provided that the gross retail mar-
Economic Review 
tion and Optimal Product Diversity.
etables category relative to that in the fresh 
gin substantially decreased in the frozen veg-
” American 
67(1977):297–308. 
“The Effect of 
vegetables category in the period that slotting 
allowances emerged. 
An alternative explanation for the recent 
narrowing of the gross retail margin on pro­
cessed foods relative to commodities is the 
proliferation of branded, processed goods. To 
the extent that product proliferation makes re­
tail demand (per brand) more elastic, an in­
crease in the variety of processed products 
would place downward pressure on the gross 
retail margin for processed goods relative to 
commodities. It is interesting to note that this 
trend toward differentiated processed goods 
may be related to the emergence of slotting al­
lowances. An increase in the elasticity of retail 
demand would provide a larger incentive for 
food processors to employ slotting allowances, 
which suggests that a potentially important 
nexus may exist that links the coincident trends 
toward slotting allowances and product prolif­
eration in the processed product categories. 
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